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Introduction
The war in Afghanistan is drawing to a close and once again the U.S. Army (Army) is facing a drawdown. The cycle is predictable. When war comes, the Army expands and adapts as necessary to achieve the military objectives of the war; then, once the war is over; the Army rapidly reduces in size. Throughout our history, this cycle has repeated itself over and over. Additionally, when war does come, our Army may or may not be prepared for the war it has to fight. This leads to painful lessons measured in blood and treasure at the beginning of a conflict quickly followed by efforts to never let it happen again. But it does happen, over and over again. Why? Is it possible to avoid these painful lessons? Are there enduring lessons to be learned from this cycle?
Are the variables of the strategic environment such that it is impossible for the United States to build a peacetime Army that can accomplish its wartime mission without having to go through a complete redesign?
The current strategic environment is full of risks and opportunities. Major issues facing the United States revolve around terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to space and cyberspace assets, dependence upon fossil fuels, climatic change, pandemic disease, failing states, global criminal networks, and the global economy.
1 Specific challenges such as China's growing military capabilities and economic influence, the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring, North Korea's provocative actions, and Iran's increasing ambitions in the Persian Gulf region are simply the beginning of a long list of potential threats that our Army must prepare for.
In some respects the current strategic environment is not all that different today [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . Starting with the strategic and domestic environments of each era; the paper will describe investment decisions made by the Army. Then using the first battle of the next conflict, the performance of the resulting Army shaped by those decisions is evaluated.
The investment decisions will be described in terms of end strength, force structure, leadership development, modernization, procurement, doctrine, and readiness. End strength is the overall number of personnel in each component of the Army as authorized by law. End strength becomes one of the primary drivers for personnel policies. Force structure is the number, size, and composition of the units that comprise the Army; e.g., divisions, brigades, battalions. 2 Leadership development is the professional schooling and professional development of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the force. Modernization looks at research and development efforts, while procurement concentrates on the actual expenditures to buy equipment. Doctrine is the underlying foundation through which Army describes the missions and tasks it performs. Readiness is a measurement of the ability the Army to perform its assigned missions and tasks. The objective is to compare these seven 3 investment areas across the three drawdown eras, identify common trends, and propose recommendations for future areas of Army investment.
The Army after World War I (1919-1938)
Strategic Environment
The international environment following WWI offered great promise of a peaceful and threat free environment. After nearly four years of intensive warfare, the great powers of Europe suffered incredible losses of manpower and were highly in debt.
Germany was disarmed. Russia was in the midst of a destructive revolution. Japan was far away and only considered a naval threat. The idea that wars could be avoided through negotiation was gaining strength throughout the international community.
3 Domestically, the environment was not favorable to a large active Army. The
Army in WWI had grown to a force of nearly four million, and now was an expensive liability costing upwards of $50 million per day ($763 million in 2013 dollars). 4 In 1919, the Nation was operating under a deficit that equated to nearly 17% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the National Debt reached nearly 35% of GDP. Government spending equated to 24% of GDP. 5 The pressure to cut government spending, eliminate the deficit, and reduce the debt was very strong. The deployment of an Army to fight in Europe was considered an "aberration" that was not likely to be repeated any time soon. 6 With no apparent threats; a large standing Army was a prime target for budget cuts.
Economically, much of the world prospered following the end of WWI. Then, in 1929, the Great Depression struck the U.S. stock market. In quick order, the U.S. and world economies dropped into the deepest and longest depression of the twentieth century. 7 
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Strategic Guidance
At the start of WWI, the Army was consumed with mobilization and deployment.
Then it was fully engaged with the task of demobilization. Not much strategic thought
was given regarding what kind of Army was appropriate for a post-war United States. 8 The Army Chief of Staff at the time was General Peyton March. In 1919, General
March proposed to Congress that the active Army end strength consist of 509,000 enlisted men and 26,000 officers. 9 This proposal was significantly larger than the prewar Army and met with considerable skepticism by Congress. For comparison, in 1914 the Army consisted of 98,511 enlisted and 5,033 officers. 10 The proposed force structure included one field army of five corps composed of four divisions each. 11 The divisions would have their full structure, but would only be manned to 50% of their authorized strength. 12 The remainder would be filled by conscripts in wartime. General March was unable to defend the strategic rationale for such a large force structure; therefore
Congress rejected it as too expensive and unrealistic. 13 This then set the stage for Congress to provide the Army strategic guidance in the form of the National Defense Act of 1920. This act established three components for the Army: the active Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. It went on to specify three missions for the active Army. The first mission was to prepare the civilian components (e.g., the National Guard and the Organized Reserve) for war. The second was to occupy overseas garrisons (e.g., Philippines and the Panama Canal).
The third was to maintain a small regular Army force for immediate tactical use. The active Army end strength was to consist of 280,000 enlisted soldiers and 18,000 officers. 14 
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Army Decisions While Congress, through the National Defense Act of 1920, was very specific in directing the structure and missions of the Army, they did not back up that strategic direction and provide the appropriate funding to match those same directives.
Immediately following the war, Army spending equaled about 11.5% of GDP, but dropped, in 1920 to 1.8%. From 1922 on, Army spending relative to GDP steadily decreased from 0.6% GDP to a low of about 0.4% of GDP in 1927. 15 Army spending then stayed consistently at about .4% GDP until 1930 when it began a slow rise. Some of those spending increases can be attributed to Depression era works projects (e.g.,
Civilian Conservation Corps in 1933) and development and growth of the Army Air
Corps. 16 However, despite these increases in spending, overall Army spending remained at less than 1% GDP until 1941. 17 The Army, faced with a strategy/resource mismatch, focused on force structure, end strength, and leadership development at the expense of modernization, procurement, and doctrine.
Implementation of Army Decisions
End strength -The active Army described in the National Defense Act of 1920 was quickly reduced in 1922 to an authorization of 118,000 enlisted and 12,000
officers. 18 Personnel policies in place at the time encouraged the retention of WWI veterans; therefore, to accomplish the dual tasks of meeting end strength and retaining experienced veterans the Army created pay, promotion, and retention policies that favored WWI veterans. For instance: pay was tied to time in service, not rank;
promotions were tied to vacancies, not merit; and an officer could easily serve in his present rank until he was retirement eligible. 19 While the personnel policies Readiness -The policy of having a large force structure that was only partially manned manifested itself in the lack of readiness of the Army. Funding was not available to maneuver units in the field. Even if funding had been available, the units were not manned at a level to support such training. There was no way for the Army to gain experience in such things as maneuvering large units, sustaining large combat formations, integrating combined arms, or even simply experimenting on a large scale with alternative doctrine. This remained the case until very late in the era. As war in Europe began to grow more imminent, the Army began to do more and larger exercises, but manning levels and equipping shortages continued to limit their usefulness. In Asia other events began to influence the strategic environment. The Soviet Union continued to gain influence through their support to the Communist Chinese. 32 The Communist Chinese defeated the Nationalist Chinese. In 1945, government spending on defense equated to 36% of GDP. 34 The Army's spending equated to 22% of GDP. Stacked on top of all this government spending, the national debt equated to 121% of GDP. There was great concern that following the war the U.S. would slip back into another financial depression caused by the rapid transition from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. 35 Despite this threat, the government cut defense spending dramatically and by 1948 defense spending was down to 4% of GDP and there was a slight surplus of revenue. 36 The Army's share of spending dropped to a post WWII low of about 1% of GDP.
Another factor that influenced the domestic environment was the establishment The Ridgeway phase lasted from 1953 to 1955. In this phase the Army took a 28% reduction in end strength and a 40% reduction in spending. 38 This equated to a reduction from 3.5% to 2.5% GDP. 39 The Army vigorously opposed the New Look strategy and the reliance upon nuclear weapons and chose instead to focus once again upon maintaining end strength and force structure. 40 There were no significant doctrinal, organizational, or modernization initiatives.
The Taylor Phase lasted from 1955 to 1959. Taylor was also an outspoken critic of the New Look strategy; however, unlike Ridgeway, he also laid out the logical underpinnings of a strategy that would later be adopted by the Kennedy Administration as the Flexible Response strategy. Furthermore he had a vision of how the Army needed to change in order to stay relevant on the modern battlefield. Taylor's approach was to provide the President with a technologically advanced Army equipped with a variety of capabilities that could function on both a nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield. 41 During this four year period, the Army's share of GDP dropped another 25% to 1.87%, but then remained relatively steady until 1965 when the Vietnam War created a growth in the defense budget. Officers were encouraged to obtain a broad variety of experience in different positions.
Selection for battalion and brigade command was a Division commander responsibility.
Modernization -No significant modernization took place during the Ridgeway phase.
Procurement -Like the era following WWI, the Army was forced to rely upon materiel procured during the Korean War by stretching out new procurement over 15 years.
Doctrine -Ridgeway rejected any suggestion that nuclear weapons changed the way the Army should operate. 45 WWII doctrine still applied and therefore few doctrinal changes emerged.
Readiness -Large force structures and limited funds once again conspired to constrain Army readiness. Ridgeway attempted to offset the end strength / force structure imbalance by reducing both the size of the combat division, and by reducing the institutional army. 46 Standardization of training suffered as the task of training initial entry soldiers moved from the institutional Army to individual tactical units.
Compounding the training issue, continental U.S. based units were at a lower manning level than their overseas counterparts and therefore faced more difficulty assuming the responsibility of training the new soldiers. 47 
Implementation of Army Decisions-Taylor Phase 1955-59
End strength -Continued to steadily decline to 862,000 in 1959, a 78% decrease in four years. General Westmoreland focused on four priorities: 1) improve management, 2)
implement the All Volunteer Army, 3) restart modernization programs, and 4) increase professionalism. 59 General Abrams continued Westmoreland's priorities and instituted three of his own: 1) development of a strategic vision for the Army, 2) changes to force structure, and 3) changes to the Army stationed in the United States. 60 
Implementation of Army Decisions
End strength -Whereas previously the Army could rely upon the draft to achieve end strength numbers, now it was increasingly challenged to man the volunteer Army.
In 1969, the Army end strength was 1.5 million soldiers. After a rapid drawdown through 1974, that end strength remained around 780,000 soldiers for the rest of the decade. 61 The Army quickly learned that it needed to provide incentives, such as a college fund, in order to recruit quality soldiers and maintain the authorized end strength. Post-Vietnam Army decisions followed a different path from previous draw downs. While the Army once again emphasized end strength and force structure, creating hollow units that were not well trained or equipped, it also managed to create a new officer management system, invest in doctrine reform, and invest in research for future modernization.
Common to these post-war eras is the Army's tendency to emphasize end strength and force structure over other budget priorities. While the rationale seems logical, the end result is less than satisfying. In every case the Army created units that could not train due to a combination of shortages of personnel and funding. Additionally, large force structures made it difficult to equip the Army with updated equipment due to the cost of doing so.
A better approach would be to avoid over-structuring the Army and concentrate investments in three key areas: 1) units manned at or near their authorized strength to facilitate training and readiness, 2) continue vigorous doctrine development and instill that doctrine through realistic combat training center exercises in order to prevent the stagnation of capabilities, and 3) a sufficient modernization effort informed by doctrine to support eventual procurement of advanced capabilities.
Manning units at or near their authorized strength enables those units to conduct realistic training. This is important for several reasons. First it provides the unit leadership planning and operational experience. The kind of experience that is transferable across many organizations and missions. Second, every training event provides an opportunity to assess and further develop doctrine. Lastly, a manned and trained unit is easier to adapt to emerging missions compared to building a unit from scratch. This last point emphasizes the requirement for the Army to retain flexibility and adaptability towards a changing world environment.
Continuous doctrine development and enforcement of that doctrine through realistic combat training center exercises was one of the key factors leading to the success of Desert Storm. The environment will continue to evolve. A systemic process that evaluates current doctrine against the environment, assesses unit readiness through the ability to execute doctrine, and provides feedback from unit assessments to the doctrine development process is essential. Over the last ten years of war, the doctrine process may not have kept up with what units were actually tasked to do.
Reinvigorating this systemic process is critical to the future success of the Army.
A modernization effort informed by doctrine is another key area for investment.
As in past draw down periods, Army procurement accounts are sure to be cut Department and Army leaders, despite reduced budgets, can make wise investments that will bear fruit for the next generation of America's warriors.
